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Water System Security:
It’s
Important!!!!!
Chlorine Security Summits
5.5 PA DEP Contact Hours (water and wastewater)
Don't miss
these important Summits!!!
The PA-AWWA and WWOAP
Operator Training Zone (Central)
in cooperation with the PA-AWWA Security Committee
Wednesday, December 12, 2007
HACC-Harrisburg, PA (Central)
  
We thank our sponsor:
Vendors:
•Chlorinators Incorporated
•CSM Solutions, Inc.
•Geiger Pump & Equipment Company
•Kay/Lin Associates, Inc.
•Kershner Environmental Technologies
•Steckbeck Engineering
•U.S. Security Care, Inc.
•Univar USA, Inc.
REGISTER NOW!!!
Wednesday,
March 19, 2008
Harmarville, PA (West)
AGENDA
REGISTRATION FORM
Vendor and Sponsorship Opportunities!!!
For more information contact Mike Snyder at 717-774-8870 or
mikesnyder@paawwa.org
The Chlorine Security Summit
will have a special session at PA-AWWA's 60th Annual
Conference in Valley Forge on May 15, 2008.
_______________________
October 19, 2007
AWWA Utility Alert regarding Chemical Security Survey sent
to water utilities 10/19/2007
Click here for more information
_______________________
October 18, 2007
AWWA Washington Report
Chemical Security Issues
Click for more information
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Chlorine attacks in Iraq spur warnings in US
Water-plant vigilance urged
By Charlie Savage, Globe Staff |
July 24, 2007
WASHINGTON -- A spate of deadly
chlorine bomb attacks in Iraq is prompting the Bush
administration to urge nearly 3,000 municipal water
treatment plants in the United States to make sure their
chlorine gas is well protected -- spotlighting what
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has singled
out as a "gap in our system of regulation."
Although some plants have switched to
less dangerous methods of disinfecting drinking and
waste water, many still add chlorine gas to kill
bacteria. The gas can also be used as a chemical weapon.
In recent months, Iraqi insurgents have started
attaching chlorine cylinders to car bombs and roadside
explosives to burn people's lungs, eyes, and skin
downwind from a blast.
With chlorine bombs becoming a
high-profile weapon of choice for terrorists abroad,
officials at the Department of Homeland Security fear
that terrorists might try to copy the tactic, making
chlorine tanks at water plants, which range from
150-pound cylinders to 90-ton rail tankers, an obvious
target for sabotage or theft.
There are 1,700 drinking water
facilities and 1,150 waste water plants that still use
chlorine, including about 50 in New England that keep at
least 2,500 pounds of the chemical on site, according to
data from the Environmental Protection Agency . In
Massachusetts alone, 22 water plants are currently
registered as chlorine users with the EPA.
In a recent speech, Chertoff urged
water authorities to pay for whatever fences, cameras,
and guards are necessary to "make sure that these
dangerous chemicals they have on site are not stolen,
because, unfortunately, if you look over to Iraq, you're
going to see these kinds of chemicals wind up in
improvised explosive devices."
Chertoff has no power to do anything
more than urge vigilance on the part of water treatment
plant operators. Although Congress passed a law in
October giving his department the power to make sure
that most chemical facilities have effective security,
lawmakers exempted water treatment plants from the new
regulations.
"For those of you who are not subject
to regulation, I don't want you to breathe a sigh of
relief like 'We're off the hook,' " Chertoff said.
"You're on the hook, because you're going to have to do
this yourselves until the time comes along that
regulatory authority to address these is given to us or
to some other agency."
Today , the House Homeland Security
Committee will hold its first oversight hearing on
chemical security this year, and some watchdog groups
are now calling on Congress to revisit its October 2006
chemical security legislation to make it tougher. Among
the critics' chief targets is the exemption for water
treatment plants.
"There's 10 things wrong with the
chemical security rules, and I list this one first,"
said Rick Hind , legislative director of the Greenpeace
Toxics Campaign. "The water treatment plants exemption
is easiest to understand. Three thousand facilities --
wow, that's a big omission."
But water treatment plant operators
say they will oppose any effort to get rid of their
exemption. Operators argue that it is unnecessary to
have Homeland Security looking over their shoulder
because they are already making any necessary upgrades.
They also argue that they do not want to pay for any
additional fencing and guards that Homeland Security
might require.
"If there are regulations that require
additional investment in security measures beyond what
has been done, I think we would request federal funding
for that," said Rebecca West, who is the vice president
of the Water Environment Federation and also manages 14
water treatment plants in South Carolina.
Water treatment lobbyists also point
out that their facilities are overseen by the EPA. Under
the Clean Air Act, plants submit risk-management plans
to the EPA. And under the 2002 Bioterrorism Act,
drinking water plants were required to certify to the
EPA that they had assessed their security
vulnerabilities.
But these arguments, which water
treatment lobbyists used to help persuade Congress last
fall to exempt them from "redundant" new federal
regulations, have been heavily criticized by homeland
security specialists. They argue that the EPA's programs
are not an adequate substitute for Homeland Security's
regulations when it comes to preventing thefts or
sabotage of chlorine tanks.
The EPA's risk-management program
focuses on safe practices for handling chlorine and
plans for dealing with any accidental release, not
perimeter security. The Bioterrorism Act focused on
preventing the poisoning of drinking water, not
protecting chlorine cylinders, and it did not cover
waste water plants at all.
Critics also point to a recent series
of thefts of chlorine canisters from water treatment
plants as proof that such facilities cannot be trusted
to pay for adequate security on their own.
In April, Arthur Dungan , president of
the Chlorine Institute, the research and safety arm of
the chlorine industry, sent out a warning to members
that someone had stolen three full 150-pound cylinders
of chlorine from a water treatment site in California in
February and April 2007.
In addition, he wrote, police in two
other California counties had reported unsuccessful
attempts to steal chlorine from municipal water
treatment plants that spring.
After the first theft, police had
suspected the thieves may have thought they were taking
a different chemical that would be useful in
manufacturing drugs. But when it happened again, Dungan
wrote, "concerns were heightened" because it was clear
they were targeting the chemical.
"The use of chlorine by terrorists in
Iraq has heightened all our concerns, and we should be
vigilant in doing all we can do to minimize the
possibility of unauthorized persons obtaining any type
of chlorine container," he wrote, urging operators to
report any similar thefts to the FBI and to one another.
The letter was later obtained by Congress.
In a phone interview last week, Dungan
said the chlorine thefts remained unsolved -- and that
he learned of a similar theft of at least one chlorine
gas cylinder from a Texas water treatment facility in
June.
Dungan also said he believed water
treatment plants ought to be included in the Department
of Homeland Security's chemical security regulations.
"If you meet the threshold quantities
-- whether you're a chemical plant, a grocery store, or
whatever -- you ought to be covered" by the department's
security rules, Dungan said. "There should not be a
blanket exclusion."
But West, of the Water Environment
Federation, argued that thefts of chlorine cylinders
from plants in California and Texas do not necessarily
prove that the industry needs to be regulated by
Homeland Security. In general, she said, most plants
have done a good job in voluntarily upgrading their
fencing and guards on their own.
"I think that just looking at one
isolated area is not indicative of whether or not the
efforts have been successful," she said.
Representative Edward J. Markey, a
Malden Democrat who sits on the Homeland Security
Committee, said Congress should require "the highest
risk facilities [to] switch to safer processes or
chemicals whenever possible" -- and to wipe away the
exemption to homeland security laws for water treatment
plants.
"In light of the use of chlorine as a
weapon by terrorists in Iraq and the reported and
attempted thefts of chlorine from California water
facilities, it is utterly essential that Congress pass
comprehensive legislation that requires that all
chemical facilities undertake significant security
upgrades," Markey said. "No exemptions, no loopholes,
and no further delays." |
©
Copyright
2007 The New York Times Company
_______________________
May 3, 2007
AWWA Public Affairs Advisory
The attached advisory went
out yesterday in regards to an ABC-TV segment
on fire hydrants and water security.
Click here to read
advisory
_______________________
Vandalism to a town’s well building demonstrates the ongoing
need for water system security.
By Mark Wetzel
In March 2006, a water storage tank in the town of Blackstone,
Mass., was vandalized by three teenagers, potentially
contaminating the water system serving the town’s 9,000
residents. The security breach resulted in a ban on all water
use until the water was tested, the system was flushed and it
was verified that the water was safe for all uses.
One Blackstone resident said, “I didn’t think it was that
easy to get to our water supply.”
Establishing the VA
Protection of public water supplies from terrorism, vandalism
and other threats has long been a part of operating a water
system. The events of Sept. 11, 2001, however, heightened the
concern. As a result, the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 required that
all community water systems serving a population of 3,300 people
or more complete a vulnerability assessment (VA).
The VA identified the potential threats, critical facilities,
critical customers, consequences of losing a critical facility,
current status of the facilities with respect to the potential
threats, and implementation of improvements, procedures and
other mitigation measures to counteract the system’s
vulnerability. By June 30, 2004, all water systems were expected
to have completed a VA and submitted it to the U.S. EPA.
While many cities and towns have implemented the
recommendations of the VA, many have not, potentially leaving
their water systems at risk. The recent security breach in
Massachusetts and similar events throughout the country
emphasize the need to make water system security a continuous
process.
Designing a system
The initial step in updating or implementing a security
program is determining the utility’s current status. This should
be followed by reviewing the VA study recommendations and
determing what was implemented and which recommendations are
still pertinent. The American Water Works Association (AWWA)
security guidance documents and the EPA water security website (www.epa.gov/safewater/security/)
are excellent tools for reassessing security needs, programs and
priorities.
On its website, the EPA identifies “14 Features of Active and
Effective Security,” which are organized into four categories
below. Organizational
-
Explicit commitment to security;
-
Promote security awareness; and
-
Defined security roles and employee expectations.
Operational
-
Vulnerability assessment (VA) up to date;
-
Security resources and implementation priorities;
-
Contamination detection;
-
Threat-level-based protocols;
-
Emergency response plan tested and up to date; and
-
Utility-specific measures and self-assessment.
Infrastructure
-
Intrusion detection and access control;
-
Information protection and continuity; and
-
Design and construction standards.
External
-
Communications; and
-
Partnerships.
Water utilities can use these guidelines to help shape their
VAs and security plans. The VA should be considered a “living
document” that is updated on a regular basis (every one to three
years) based on changing needs, conditions and standards. This
regular review allows you to reevaluate your utility’s
vulnerabilities, security practices and responsibilities, and to
employ new security tools and technologies. In addition, the
review provides utility staff an opportunity to update
security-related budget needs on an annual basis as part of the
VA update.
Policies and procedures
Organizational and management considerations are generally
easy to implement in a water security program. These issues
typically involve communication, planning, staff training, and
changing policies and procedures. Some examples include:
-
Background checks of all employees;
-
Key and lock management systems;
-
Contractor/vendor/supplier policies for background
checks, sign-in/sign-out policies and escorts at critical
facilities;
-
Cyber-security and information access policies;
-
Materials management/emergency procurement;
-
Public education and neighborhood watches; and
-
Mutual aid procedures.
After developing these policies and procedures, utility
managers need to communicate them to their staff and other
stakeholders. In addition, security training may be required to
ensure that staff understands and can implement the new
policies. The AWWA, EPA and Water Environment Federation offer
significant training resources, and the AWWA’s security guidance
information outlines relevant training for water utility
personnel.
Operational considerations
Making operational changes can be the most cost-effective
method of significantly improving physical security as well as
system reliability. Similar to capital security improvements,
operational changes should be implemented in a “layered”
approach, beginning at the site perimeter and extending to the
site, the building, and the building or facility’s systems.
These changes should be developed for every facility including
source water, intakes and impoundments, wells and pumping
stations, treatment facilities, storage facilities and the
distribution system. Administration, operations and storage
facilities are also critical components and must be included in
the security plan.
By now, many VAs and operational procedures utilities put in
place as a result of the initial heightened security response
may have been stopped or reduced due to changes in priorities,
staffing, or a lack of threats or incidents.
Re-energizing the security program with training, defining
responsibilities and measuring progress will keep operations
focused on the importance of security. An example of general
operational practices for a water facility using a layered
approach is demonstrated in Table 1, developed by the AWWA.
Physical security
Physical security improvements for existing facilities are
the most difficult to implement due to costs, financing and
perceived benefit. Physical security components for new
facilities, however, may be easier to implement, as they can be
designed and budgeted as a component of the total capital
improvement cost.
Both the AWWA and the Great Lakes Upper Mississippi River
Board (also known as the Ten-State Standards) proposed physical
design considerations for water facilities, including:
-
Redundancy or enhanced security features for critical
single points of failure;
-
Design for effective response or replacement of critical
components including standardization, re-procurement lead
time, availability of key parts and provision for a critical
parts inventory;
-
Control of human/vehicle access to facilities including
barriers, hardened windows, doors and louvers, intrusion
detection, site lighting, video surveillance and alarm
monitoring;
-
Hardened locking devices, hatches and hard-ware for
storage facilities, pumping stations, power stations,
vaults, and chemical storage and fill facilities;
-
Cyber security measures for SCADA, system networks and
other IT-based operations including redundancy, data backup,
password security and manual overrides;
-
Real-time water quality monitoring with alarms at
sources and key areas in the water system for detection of
intentional contamination; and
-
Facilities and procedures for handling storage, delivery
and protection of chemicals and fuel used at all facilities.
Just as with operational changes, physical security systems
should also be designed using a “layered” method, requiring an
intruder to penetrate multiple separate barriers. The selection
of these systems needs to be based on the vulnerability,
potential risks and consequences of failure for each facility.
Utilities must also consider their current level of
operations—does the utility have sufficient staff to monitor
video surveillance and respond to alarms, or staff expertise to
maintain the equipment?
Because implementing physical security improvements can be
expensive and often competes with other capital projects, they
will require prioritizing and phasing. A typical cost-benefit
analysis is difficult to use in these evaluations, as many of
the benefits cannot be converted to a monetary value; however,
using a numerical risk-reduction technique can help quantify the
effectiveness of proposed security improvements.
Maintaining security
Keeping water system security as an active part of the
operations of a water system is a difficult task. Implementing a
process that continuously monitors progress and effectiveness is
critical to keeping our public drinking water safe and our
systems secure from potential threats. Several methods can help
overcome the tendency to forget about the importance of
security:
-
Identify managers and staff who are responsible for
security;
-
Establish security expectations;
-
Incorporate security procedures and responsibilities
into job descriptions and standard operating procedures;
-
Provide training on a regular basis to existing and new
employees;
-
Develop specific measures and perform self assessments;
-
Keep vulnerability assessments and emergency response
plans up to date; and
-
Communicate the status and activities to staff, public
safety officials, regulators and the community (as
appropriate).
Finding help
There are hundreds of water security resources available to
assist in developing, improving and implementing a water system
security plan. The EPA and AWWA websites provide resources and
links to other organizations specifically related to water
system security. These resources, tools, training programs and
guides will make implementation of specific issues or programs
much easier.
Our world has changed, and water system security will forever
be a critical component of operating and maintaining a public
water system. It is the water supplier’s responsibility to make
sure the health and safety of its customers and community are
protected and that security is always a priority.
Mark Wetzel is a
principal with Stantec Consulting, Inc. and leader of the firm’s
environmental infrastructure division in New England and New
York. He can be reached at 978/692-1913 or by e-mail at mwetzel@stantec.com.
Source: Water & Wastes
Digest November 2006 Volume: 46 Number: 11
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